The eve of World War II saw the development of direct connections between public relations experts and issues of foreign affairs in the United States. Public relations professionals assisted both internationalists and non-interventionists to spread their arguments across the nation, helping them to hone their messages, to organize, and to raise money. All of the main citizens' organizations created during this period sought public relations assistance in the face of growing popular awareness of global events, and with an awareness of the need for public relations counsel in the face of an increasingly measurable concept of public opinion.
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on the domestic corporate world. 6 On the other hand, scholars of American foreign relations have considered public relations only very broadly, and almost wholly through considerations of propaganda and of governmental institutions. 7 Nor has the recent boom in studies on 6 On public relations, see Scott M. 1942 -1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978 .
6 public diplomacy seen direct connections drawn to public relations techniques. 8 And despite a growing literature on the connections between the corporate world and politics, links between the history of foreign relations and business history have been largely overlooked, but those links are nevertheless important in understanding public support for foreign policy adventures.
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The new connection between public relations companies and foreign relations issues on the eve of World War II reflected a growing awareness in the United States of crises in Europe and Asia, but it meant more than that. It signaled an acknowledgment that this looming conflict was, in the words of the America First Committee's R. Douglas Stuart, a "war of ideas". Those ideas about international affairs needed to be amplified, explained and reiterated to the nation. The connection between foreign relations and public relations also 8 On public diplomacy, see Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information 7 highlighted a growing consensus about the importance of public opinion in an increasingly democratic and "mass" society, while revealing a desire to try and manage, persuade and alter that opinion if necessary. Politicians cautiously but quickly followed the citizens' groups in recognizing the potential of this persuasive power in selling foreign policy positions.
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Connecting Public Relations and Foreign Relations
The debate over entry into World War II helped establish a lasting connection between public relations and foreign affairs. The public relations profession evolved rapidly through the early years of the twentieth century. As historian Richard Tedlow has argued, the profession of public relations in this period can be broadly defined as "controlling the news… by planned and organized effort through informing and cultivating the press and through encouraging the corporation itself to alter its policies in accord with perceived public desires." Most importantly here, public relations experts worked closely with organizations to create policy.
The profession therefore moved beyond the "press agentry" of the nineteenth century where externally hired publicists took orders from corporate management. It also offered a more subtle and sophisticated approach than simple advertising. 
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The first significant encounter between the burgeoning public relations concept and foreign relations came with the wartime success of George Creel's Committee on Public
Information during World War I. As Scott Cutlip has argued, the wartime success of Creel's short-lived Committee on Public Information and the Liberty Loan drives "created a widespread awareness and blind faith in the power of publicity" at the end of World War I.
Creel's success was reinforced by the public campaigns for prohibition and women's suffrage that culminated at the end of the war. As a result, the era saw the rapid expansion of public relations as an industry, as well as seeing numerous studies on the concept of public opinion, With Roosevelt reluctant to create a national propaganda agency of any kind, the private internationalist movement led the way in terms of shaping public opinion. They organized and fought the public relations battle for opinion in a way the president could not, and in doing so they took full advantage of professional public relations assistance. The internationalists needed every possible tool to sway the strongly non-interventionist public, and the concept of public relations offered something new. Roosevelt was happy for the internationalists to lead the way, though he and the government then followed their lead once the United States joined the war. Of course, the great debate had two sides, and the noninterventionist forces felt compelled to respond. They too attempted to utilize public relations professionals to spread their message as widely and effectively as possible. The immediacy of the domestic debate over war allowed public relations professionals a route back into foreign policy considerations, moving beyond the idea that they simply offered propaganda for the U.S. government or for foreign nations. Price. Frustrated with the lack of economic sanctions against Japan, they felt that the United
States needed to stop providing material to Japan because doing so supported Japanese
aggression. Yet even with such a clear political objective, the ACNPJA sought professional assistance from the rapidly developing field of public relations to maximize its effectiveness.
In January 1939 the ACNPJA obtained the assistance of the John Price Jones Corporation, initially for just two weeks to raise awareness of the committee. However, the ACNPJA asked the Corporation to go further and provide advice and suggestions for the Committee's future organization, publicity and fund raising. After two weeks of preliminary investigation, the Corporation produced its report on suggested steps for the ACNPJA. In terms of organization, the Corporation suggested creating local committees in order to create a nationwide response, rather than simply relying on the leadership of the National Committee. The Corporation also noted that the ACNPJA's leadership needed strengthening to include "at least one man or woman from each of the social, economic, racial, religious, political or geographic groups" to be asked for support.
This strong call for thematic breadth of representation in addition to numerical depth was a consistent message from public relations professionals throughout this period, as it would help organizations prove their legitimacy to the public. Ultimately to its detriment, the ACNPJA chose largely to ignore this advice, rejecting a mass membership approach to organization, although some particularly active supporters felt strongly enough to create local and largely autonomous committees of their own.
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With regard to publicity, the Corporation's main advice was the rather obvious point that the ACNPJA "urgently" needed publicity counsel to publicize its activities, whether this was promoting addresses from speakers, endorsements from prominent individuals, 
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The Corporation specifically suggested organizing a women's auxiliary, a labor section and a "negro section," and the CDAAA acted on this advice by creating National
Divisions to bolster representation in areas of perceived weakness. They specifically adopted a "qualitative approach… to develop support in these 'weak spot' areas in which opposition is most likely to take root." Three sections of society targeted due to their divided opinion of the growing international crisis were youth (particularly students), women, and labor. By
October 1940 the CDAAA had established four National Divisions: the Youth Division, the College Division, the Women's Division, and the Labor Division. Of the four, the most developed was the College Division, which had sixty-eight chapters by June 1941.
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The Corporation also urged the CDAAA to approach the African American community, albeit with extreme caution. Reluctant to be seen as overly liberal with respect to domestic racial politics or interfering in local politics, CDAAA leaders never considered a separate Division because it was unlikely to achieve mass support and could lead to the loss of political support elsewhere. However, with a genuine sense that African American representation was important, the John Price Jones Corporation emphasized that African
Americans needed targeting as they were particularly vulnerable to fifth column activities.
Corporation Vice-President Harold J. Seymour expressed concern that the nation's thirteen However, the Corporation highlighted a number of weaknesses with the CDAAA.
Regarding its central message, the CDAAA now lacked a clear "fighting objective." Where it was once out ahead of general public opinion, the events of the previous six months had overtaken the committee and seen it fall behind, a criticism highlighted by the fact that both presidential candidates were in support of maximum aid to Britain. In fact, the concept of aid "short of war," so important at the Committee's beginning, had become a liability that was increasingly difficult to define. The most logical course was the one most likely to ensure the nation's "ultimate national safety," although it was impossible to tell whether that course could be pursued without recourse to war. 
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of the CDAAA, and he resigned on 2 January 1941. Given the circumstances, the Corporation conceded that publicity progress at this point was "not in our hands." The Corporation acknowledged that one result of the controversy over White's statement was that the CDAAA was very much in the public eye, suggesting that all publicity was good publicity; however, it also acknowledged that the rift in the Committee led to public confusion. Fortunately, the public's attitude toward the organization quickly became more sympathetic as the CDAAA offered its full support for the Roosevelt's Lend-Lease bill, which offered virtually unlimited aid to Britain. The Committee played a significant role in the popular debate over the bill, countering the strong opposition of the America First
Committee.
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With the passage of the bill in March however, the public increasingly questioned the need for CDAAA. After all, as the Lend-Lease Act offered all possible aid to the allies, it appeared the Committee's work was complete. The Corporation was all too aware of this sentiment, and from the beginning of April it acknowledged that the public felt the CDAAA was "no longer needed" and did not understand why the organization might need further financial donations. The CDAAA's finances urgently needed a boost. 
Failing to Articulate Sentiment: the America First Committee
The non-interventionist movement also recognized that public relations assistance was essential in spreading its message as widely and successfully as possible to the American raising organization such as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies" and that applied to public relations more broadly. But the search for support also reflected the organization's strong belief that public opinion could be -and indeed needed to be -molded and steered in a particular direction, away from war. In attempting to express complicated ideas to an increasingly "mass" public spread across a continent, the organization needed all the help it could get.
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Legacy
While the citizens' organizations on the eve of war were confident in their own message, they recognized that the urgency of the great debate required more than a series of press releases or advertisements for newspapers. The heightened sensitivity to public opinion -due to the international context, the democratic nature of the debate, and new polling methods and public relations techniques -meant that they sought new and effective ways to amplify their message to an increasingly interested and politically important public. The public relations assistance of the era helped in a number of key ways that went far beyond simply selling advertising, writing copy, and getting the internationalist or non-interventionist message out.
They helped with administration and organization, notably with the John Price Jones
Corporation's staffing of the CDAAA office; they helped the organizations address questions of public image; they brought force and clarity to arguments, though sometimes without full consideration of the political implications; they provided telling critiques of organizational weaknesses; and they urged the cultivation of widespread popular support, to secure political clout. However, more often than not, the message was to prioritize quality over quantity and breadth rather than depth in order to secure popular legitimacy. In that sense there was a 53 Robert Wood to Walter Shaw, 1 May 1941, Se folder, box 81, AFC Papers.
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tension in the public relations message which sought the appearance of democracy without always being especially democratic.
Nonetheless, assisted by public relations professionals, the organizations certainly had national impact. The America First Committee crystalized the national reluctance for war, while the efforts of the CDAAA mobilized opinion to aid victims of aggression. The
Roosevelt administration greatly appreciated the work of the internationalist organizations.
Roosevelt had a preference for multiple agencies and decentralized control, but he was also wary of the memory of the Committee on Public Information and reluctant to create a national propaganda agency before the nation was at war. Yet through the CDAAA he received an informal propaganda service. As historian Michael Sherry has noted, Roosevelt rejected a more formal propaganda agency in peace time "in favor of an informal publicprivate cooperation that would largely prevail for decades after the war." Public relations considerations were a key part of that ongoing cooperation. 
